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THE CHARTER: A POLITICAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE©
By ALAN C. CAiRNs*

I. INTRODUCTION
A. PoliticalPurposes
The Charter,1 following in the footsteps of its predecessor, the
Diefenbaker Bill of Rights,2 had broad political purposes. It was to be an
instrument of pan-Canadian unity by sustaining anglophone and
francophone minorities in Quebec and the other nine provinces
respectively; by restraining the centrifugal tendencies of federalism by
establishing a floor of rights to be held in common by Canadians
regardless of their provincial location; and by bonding Canadians to
their political, coast-to-coast Canadian community and to the
Constitution, which contained their rights. Indirectly, the central
government would be strengthened by the Charter's support for the
Canadian community, which Ottawa both served and shaped. In brief,
the Charterwas a powerful instrument of social engineering designed to
transform the psyche and identities of Canadians.
B. InternationalForces
It is too easy, as well as misleading, to confine our search for the
Charter'ssources to domestic factors. In the same way as the
© Copyright, 1992, Alan C. Cairns.
* Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia.

1 CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 CanadianBill ofRights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
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contemporary post-Meech constitutional process is partly driven by
globalizing economic trends, which appear to dictate a more
autonomous market indifferent to political boundaries, the drive for a
charter of rights was also linked to international cues and incentives.
The Charterwas a response to evolving international norms of statehood
that put parliamentary supremacy on the defensive and increasingly
postulated a correlation between statehood and charters/bills of rights.
Hence, the global diffusion of the Charter idea as a constitutional
instrument, its ready acceptance by citizens, and the thesis that:
[Tlhere is now an area of domestic conduct in regard to human rights ... that is under the
scrutiny of international law... [This] expose[s] the internal regimes of all the members of

international society to the legitimate appraisal of their peers. This may turn out not to
have been a negligible change in international society

3

The Charter, therefore, is in part a response to an emerging
international criterion of statehood linked to more expansive notions of
citizenship.
II. CHARTER IMPERIALISM
The Charter is imperialistic. Its various clientele seek to extend
its jurisdiction. In a general way, the attitude of Charterphilesto their
instrument is analogous to the attitudes of Oliver Mowat, W.A.C.
Bennett, and Peter Lougheed to section 92 of the BNA Act, 4 or of
Lougheed to section 109. These premiers sought, at a minimum, to
protect and, more ambitiously, to extend the scope of the powers crucial
to their governing capacities. Thus, the Legal Education and Action
Fund is to section 28 of the Charter,and the Canadian Ethno-cultural
Council is to section 27, what Oliver Mowat was to section 92 of the
BNA Act. The efforts of Charter supporters to eliminate the
notwithstanding clause precisely parallel the efforts of provincial
premiers to get rid of the federal power of disallowance. In each case,
the purpose is to eliminate intrusions on one's constitutional territory. It
is only slightly far-fetched to see the claims of Charterdevotees for a role
3 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and InternationalRelations (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986) at 152.
4 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
(formerly BNA Act).
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in the constitutional amending process as analogous to the historic
efforts of premiers to secure protective amending vetoes for their
provincial governments. While Charter supporters do not have a fully
developed, compact theory to justify their participation, they can and do
ground their claims on the fact that, like provincial governments, they
too were present at the creation. The taking of 28 by feminist groups,5
the winning of section 27 by multicultural groups, and the successful
struggle to include "disabled" in section 15 of the Charter generate
proprietary constitutional claims and participatory demands analogous
to those of provincial governments.
The Charter's imperialism is further manifest in its take-over of
much of the state's symbolism. It is, for many citizens, the primary
vehicle that gives life and meaning to the Constitution. It works directly
on the identities of citizens with its explicit message that they are
constitutional somebodies.
Ill. THE CHARTER'S IMPACT
A. Within Governments
Domestically, the Charter's impact is multi-faceted. It affects
government decision making at the policy process stage, but since that is
the subject of many other papers in this volume, I will not tarry.
B. Courts
The Charter'smost obvious locale, the courtroom, generates new
groups of court watchers and interveners. They focus intensely on the
fate of the clauses of most concern to themselves. They understand that
judicial discretion is a fact of life, and that decisions emerge from the
interaction of judge and company. Hence, they seek intervener status so
that company will be sensitive to their constitutional interests.
Court watchers and interveners are also concerned with the
composition and jurisprudential philosophies of courts, both of which
5 P. Kome, The Taking of Twenty-eight: Women Challengethe Constitution (Toronto: Women's
Press, 1983).
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are seen to have policy consequences. Thus, discussion about reforming
the Supreme Court's nomination and appointment process no longer
revolves exclusively around the relative roles of federal and provincial
governments, a reasonable focus only as long as the "umpire of
federalism" role virtually exhausted the Court's constitutional
interpretive responsibilities. Charter and Aboriginal interests focus on
the extent of ethnic, female, and other Charter categories on the bench,
and the philosophies they bring to their judging of the citizen/state
constitutional dimension.
C. Federalism
The Charter's relation to federalism is complex.6 The Charter's
linking of citizens directly to the Constitution, and the positive response
elicited, reveals the limited capacity of federalism to speak to and for the
heterogeneous composition of a modern people. 7 Federalism addresses
Canadians in terms of the territorial communities it reflects and fosters,
but we carry many other identities-as women, persons with disabilities,
Aboriginals, visible minorities, linguistic minorities, etcetera. Although
Aboriginals are in a special category, the Chartersharpens the identities
of the groups it constitutionally recognizes. This social rootedness gives
the Chartera positive symbolism that has already made it the best-known
component of the Constitution.
The combination of non-territorial identities singled out by the
Charterand its dimension of pan-Canadian rights explains why the drive
for a Charterconsistently emanated from Ottawa, while opposition came
from provincial governments. Overall, the Charter'slanguage is
sympathetic to the pan-Canadian component of federalism that sustains
the federal government, but is insensitive or indifferent to the provincial
diversities that, sociologically, justify territorially-based sub-national
governments.

6A.C Cairns, Charterversus Federalism: The Dilemmas of ConstitutionalReform (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).
7 S.V. LaSelva, "Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Rest on a Mistake?"
(1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 217.
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D. Citizenship
At the most abstract level, the Charterelevates citizenship to a
constitutional category. The citizens' possession of rights changes the
relationship between the governors and the governed. This is true in the
obvious sense that the rights of the latter are judicially enforceable
against the rights violations perpetrated by the former. Citizens
participate not only as voters influencing the composition of legislatures,
but also in their capacity to trump the majority legally by resorting to the
courts.
More important than the preceding are the subtle consequences
that flow from the possession of rights enshrined in a symbolically potent
constitutional document. New citizens are less likely to see themselves
as subjects and more likely as actors. The distribution of deference
versus a participatory egalitarianism is now more likely to emphasize the
latter, than in pre-Charterdays. This is not to suggest that we are on the
verge of a participatory Utopia of an informed citizenry engaged in a
pan-Canadian town-hall forum of discussion and decision making. It is
to suggest, however, that a greater legitimacy now attaches itself to the
citizens' role, and that dismissive repudiations of citizen input by our
governors now appear old-fashioned. The Charter,accordingly,
strengthens and transforms pre-existing weaker concepts of citizenship,
or more accurately, turns citizenship into a new constitutional category,
which requires us to rethink fundamentally the new constitutional order
in which we now live.
The magnitude of this change should not be minimized. The
obvious analogy is a massive extension of the franchise, with the
difference being that this time it is not the number that is being
increased, but the rights and responsibilities of all members of society.
This must mean more than learning to employ the language and
substance of rights for self-interested gain. Citizenship needs to be
thought of as an honourable status or, more grandly, as an office that
defines appropriate constitutional behaviour. The message of section 1
of the Charter,that its rights and freedoms are subject "to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society," is a message to citizens as well as to
governments. If it tells the latter that encroachments on rights require
strong justification, it also tells the former that they have community
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obligations, the observance of which require restraint in the aggressive
pursuit of rights.
If this reciprocal message-for governments that parliamentary
supremacy has limits, and for citizens that rights are limited-is not
effectively socialized into the behaviours of both parties, the Charter's
potential positive effects will be minimized. The goal is to find a new
equilibrium between citizen and state, not to unleash a ruthless contest
between atomistic pursuers of rights and their governmental opponents,
who cynically manipulate rights rhetoric to keep the citizenry
subservient.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The Charterenters the constitutional reform process in two ways.
Symbolically, it defines citizenship in terms of individual equality in the
possession of rights. Hence the attack on the notwithstanding clause;
hence the powerful reactions against Bill 178,8 which employed section
33 to sustain Quebec language legislation in conflict with the Charter,
hence the hostility to the Meech Lake distinct society clause for Quebec.
In general, the Charterfosters the view that deviations from the norm of
equal and similar rights are un-Canadian and, accordingly, unacceptable.
This restricts the possibilities available with which to respond to any
demand for special treatment for Quebec that is seen to involve a
differential rights regime. 9
The second way the Charterenters the constitutional reform
process is that, by connecting the citizenry directly to the Constitution
and by linking particular categories of Canadians to specific
constitutional clauses that they view as theirs, the Chartertransmits the
message that some degree of citizen participation in the constitutional
reform process is logically necessary. Further, the fact that "rights" is
the medium for this constitutional connection is psychologically
empowering in a way that a more instrumental connection would not be.
Meech Lake underlines the Charter'schallenge to the hegemony
of executive federalism in formal constitutional change. Its simple
8 An Act to Amend the Charterof the FrenchLanguage, S.Q. 1988, c. 54.
9 Report of the Commission on the Politicaland ConstitutionalFuture of Quebec (Quebec:
Commission sur I'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Qu6bec, 1991) at 34.
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message, that the Constitution does not belong to governments, and that
they, therefore, do not have an unfettered right to modify it, suggests
that the Gang of Eight's1" constitutional assumptions that inform the
amending formula did not anticipate the Charter's impact on their
domain. From one perspective, the Charterstrengthens the impulse to
constitutional participation and, thus, denies the Charles Taylor thesis
that the Charter'sstimulation of our litigious proclivities weakens our
democratic participatory tendencies-that judicial arenas displace the
democratic public arenas in which citizens, parties, and interests
compete to influence the state's policy agenda.11
On the other hand, the constitutional participant impulse takes a
particular form when its major outlet is in committee fora after
intergovernmental deals have been struck and positions hardened. In
that setting, participating Charter and Aboriginal groups will selfcentredly pursue their very particularistic objectives. They are not
induced to think of different others, or to compromise for the sake of
agreement. Elsewhere, I have labelled this tendency "constitutional
minoritarianism. ''12 It reduces constitutional citizenship to participation
in a competitive constitutional marketplace in which the burden of
reconciling competing demands is either attributed to an invisible hand
that does not exist or is thrown back to executive federalism and first
ministers, whose credentials are suspect.
The necessary revision of the overall amending process should be
guided by two fundamental concerns. First, the political and
bureaucratic managers of constitutional reform-the federal/provincial
relations offices, 13 etcetera-mustbe ever aware that they are not simply
adjusting federalism to new realities. They are modifying a
constitutional order in which the primacy of federalism for governments
must be balanced against the primacy of the Charterfor many
10

The Gang of Eight (all provinces but Ontario and New Brunswick) is the label applied to the

provinces that opposed Trudeau's threatened unilateral patriation.

11 C. Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth
Century Canada" in A.C. Cairns & C. Williams, eds., Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in
Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 183.

12 A.C.Cairns, "Constitutional Minoritarianism in Canada" in R. Watts & D. Brown, eds.,
Canada: The State of the Federation (Kingston: Institute of Government Relations, 1990) 71.
13 This refers to both the federal Provincial Relations Office and its provincial counterparts,
and to the departments responsible for intergovernmental and constitutional affairs.
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Canadians. From this perspective, Meech Lake was a bureaucratic and
political failure born of an anachronistic understanding by the governing
61ites of Canada's constitutional culture.
Second, the participant impulse tapped by the Charterand
supported by broader global democratizing trends must be given outlets
that appeal to our better, civic selves-not to our baser selves, our
parochial selves, our irresponsible selves, not to our uninformed gut
reactions to the moral complexities involved in major constitutional
change. Interest group participation driven by a narrowly focused selfinterest is insufficient, no matter how deserving and noble the goals of
individual groups may be. The Spicer alternative of constitutional
encounter groups that tap the hasty impressions of an uninformed
citizenry are equally inadequate to our task of constitutional selfrenewal. They trivialize citizenship. Robert Normand's dissenting
comment in the Report of the Citizens' Forum on Canada'sFuture is
apposite. The Forum:
basically limited itself to gathering only the superficial views of those Canadians who
addressed it, in a fashion similar to that of open-line radio shows ... citizens had a
tendency to limit themselves to stating first impressions, often based upon erroneous
information that was not corrected, and adopted radical positions without first evaluating
14
their possible consequences.

Referenda that confront the citizenry with basic choices in
settings which make it clear that their voting decision is pregnant with
consequences deserve consideration. Unlike answers to pollsters,
answers to referendum questions count. Unlike interest group
participation that stresses particularistic self-interest and leaves out the
unorganized, referendum questions on basic constitutional issues
address us as citizens joined together in a community of fate. Now that
citizens have become constitutional players, largely due to the Charter
and Aboriginal constitutional clauses, it is necessary to develop and
refine instruments that will make citizens responsible and accountable
for their constitutional choices. Meech Lake informs us how not to
proceed.

14 Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future, Report to the People and Government of Canada
(Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1991) at 144.
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V. THE CHARTER AND THE THREE CANADIAN NATIONS
The imperialism of the Charterdiscussed earlier encounters
opposition. Its generally positive reception is not evenly distributed
across what we are learning to think of as the three Canadian nationsAboriginal, Qurbrcois, and Rest of Canada (ROc). The Charter has
taken root most deeply in ROC, and in the anglophone and allophone
communities in Quebec. Visible evidence comes from the Meech Lake
hearings in which, again and again, identification with and defence of the
Charterwere cited as pervasive responses of the interveners.
Aboriginal attitudes are much less supportive, especially at the
61ite level. Aboriginal, treaty, or other rights, including the Royal
Proclamationof 17631s are, by section 25, not to be abrogated or
derogated from by the Charter-an indication that Aboriginal
constitutional identities and aspirations do not reside in Charter rights.
Some Aboriginal scholarship is profoundly hostile to the Charter,which
is viewed as incompatible with Aboriginal philosophies. 16 The federal
government proposals, Shaping Canada's Future Together, in which
Aboriginal self-government is to be subject to the Charter-contrasted
with the proposition that the Charteris to be made consistent with the
1 -are scorned as a humiliating indignity by
distinct society of QuebecZ
Professor of Aboriginal Studies, Tony Hall. "The clear assumption is
that some kinds of people can be trusted with power and some kinds of
people have to pass inspection before they can receive very constrained
powers."' 18 On the other hand, the application of the Charter to selfgoverning Aboriginal peoples is passionately advocated by the Native
Women's Association of Canada, based on their members past
experience of the predominantly male leadership on reservesP9

15

Reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, App. II.

16 M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies,
Cultural Differences" (1989-90) Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3.
17
Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1991) at 7 and at 10.
18 T. Hall, "Native Self-government: Comments on the Federal Proposals" (1991) The
Network 7.
19 Native Women's Association, Native Women and the Charter A DiscussionPaper (Ottawa).

624
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Given the manifold uncertainties that attend the constitutional
status of Aboriginal peoples, it is plausible that self-governing
Aboriginal communities of the future may be subject to a very different
and lesser Charterregime than are other Canadians.
It would be premature to write off the Charterin Quebec. It has
strong support from anglophone and allophone citizens. Occasionally, it
has been given high praise by Quebec politicians. On the other hand, it
would be naive not to recognize that the Charter'sreception among the
Quebec nationalist 61ite and the francophone intelligentsia has ranged
from hostility to indifference to lukewarm support. The Charterwas
sullied in Quebec by the inauspicious context of its origins as part of the
Constitution Act, 1982, widely interpreted as a betrayal of Quebec.
Further, the Parti Qu6b6cois government systematically used the
notwithstanding clause across the board to mute the Charter's impact
and to undermine the legitimacy of the ConstitutionAct of which it was
an important part. Now, ten years after the Charter'sintroduction, and
with the notwithstanding clause on the defensive in ROC, its strongest
defenders are in Quebec. Further, in Quebec, the Canadian Charter
encounters a rival Quebec Charter2" that has the same nationalist
credentials for Qu6b6cois that the Canadian Charter has for ROC-as a
symbol of political nationhood and identity. The Belanger-Campeau
Commission explicitly identified the Charter'suniversalizing conception
of rights as a basic impediment to the constitutional recognition of
Quebec's specificity. 21 Meech Lake's "distinct society" clause and the
present federal government proposals share the objective of filtering the
Charter'simpact on Quebec.
Pierre Fortin recently expressed a not atypical Qu6becois
attitude to the Charterin the following blunt language: In the Meech
Lake conflict, it was the "Charterof Rights against [the] distinct society,"
and the Charter triumphed.

20

Chartedes droitset liberts de lapersonne,L.R.Q., c. c-12.

21 The Charter-basedpolitical vision "perceives equality as having a strictly individual scope
and applying uniformly across Canada: it does not make allowance for Quebec society to receive
special constitutional recognition. The notion of a distinct Quebec society is thus understood as
being a source of inequality and incompatible with the principle of equality of all Canadian
citizens." Supra note 9 at 34.
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The massive rejection of Meech outside Quebec sends the following message: French
Quebec has no other legitimacy than as a collection of individuals whose rights are
protected by the CharterofRights, no more and no less than anyone else in Canada. To
most Quebecers, including many Anglophones and Allophones, this message is simply

outrageous, because it denies both the fact of the distinct society and its vulnerability in
Anglophone North America. As Quebec novelist Yves Beauchemin ably put it: "We are
a cube of sugar in a gallon of coffee." If-the cube and the coffee are treated without
two is going to dissolve into the other, and there is no question
distinction, one of the
22
which one it willbe.

Given these unique factors that, in combination, generate a
different Charteraudience in Quebec than in any other province, an
increasing divergence of the Charter's role in Quebec and in ROC cannot
be ruled out. If so, some form of explicit constitutional recognition of
that different Charterregime may ultimately follow.
To speculate in this manner about the relationship of Quebec
and Aboriginal peoples to the Charteris simply to practise a rudimentary
sociological jurisprudence that suggests that differences in the
underlying social facts in Quebec and among Aboriginal peoples may
have negative constitutional consequences for a charter designed as an
instrument of pan-Canadian integration. In different language, the
Charteris one of the sites of the struggle among the three competing
nations of Canada for constitutional living space. The outcome of the
struggle is unpredictable.

22 p. Fortin, "Quebec's Forced Choice" (Address to the Conference on the Future of Quebec
and Canada, 17 November 1990) [unpublished].

